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This paper aims to investigate the impact of U.S. foreign assistance in the English-
speaking Caribbean utilizing a sample of 4 islands (The Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and 
Trinidad and Tobago) over the period 2001-2016. This research employs fixed-effects and time 
fixed effects panel OLS regression models to predict HDI scores as proxies for holistic human 
development. The models, constructed with a 1 year lag, find that per capita total aid has a weak, 
negative, statistically insignificant impact on HDI, but a negative, statistically significant effect 
on the income component of HDI. Regardless, we find that on average, a $1000 increase in aid 
per capita is associated with a 0.132 unit decrease in predicted normalized HDI score. The results 
suggest that foreign aid could be hurting these Caribbean islands and that perhaps policy makers 
should direct a larger proportion of total aid disbursements towards more long-run drivers of 
HDI dealing primarily with educational attainment, economic wellbeing, and life expectancy. 
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The United States disburses financial aid to Caribbean countries in order to advance the 
U.S.’s strategic interests in the region, which change along with shifts in U.S. foreign policies. 
Currently, U.S. funds to Caribbean economies reflect the diverse needs of each nation ranging 
from assistance with political, security, and socioeconomic challenges, to strengthening 
democratic influences in some cases. Furthermore, the primary channel through which aid is 
disbursed to the Caribbean is the U.S. Agency for International Development (USAID), which 
divides its funds into several categories, namely: peace and security, democracy, human rights, 
and governance, health, education and social services, economic development, environment, 
humanitarian assistance, program management, and multi-sector projects (Meyer, 2018).  
 Moreover, prior to 2015, U.S. foreign assistance strategies have followed the frameworks 
highlighted in the United Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which dealt with 
alleviating humanitarian concerns. The goals set forth by the UN ranged from halving extreme 
poverty to guaranteeing universal primary education to eradicating the spread of HIV/AIDs by 
2015.  
However, under the Trump Administration, the U.S. is reassessing its foreign aid 
initiatives within the Caribbean region in terms of transitioning from traditional forms of 
development aid into strategic initiatives in the hopes of establishing bilateral engagements. 
Meyer (2018) posits that the decision of the U.S. to decrease funding to the region since FY2011 
can be attributed not only to overall foreign assistance budget cuts, but also to improving levels 




FY20171 to FY2018, U.S. financial assistance to Latin America and the Caribbean has declined 
by 36% from $1.7 billion to $617 million. Therefore it is unsurprising that U.S. financial aid to 
Latin America and the Caribbean is declining at a faster rate than in any other region in the world 
since 2016 (Meyer, 2018). It is illuminating to observe the trends observed in Figures 1 and 2, 
which expose that while overall aid disbursements to the region are in fact declining, this does 
not seem to be the case for all islands. 
 
Figure 1: Total U.S. Foreign Aid by Country in $1000s, The Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago 2001-2016 
 
As observed in Figure 2, for islands such as Trinidad and Tobago and Barbados, aid 
disbursements have fluctuated dramatically from 2001 through 2016, which is not initially 
apparent when comparing Figures 1 and 2. These shifts in foreign assistance can lend perspective 
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to this research by positing that perhaps different countries respond to socio-economic shocks in 
different ways, and are granted aid accordingly. 
 
Figure 2: Change in Total U.S. Foreign Aid by Country (%), The Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, 
Trinidad and Tobago 2001-2016 
 
Previous studies have investigated the socio-economic impacts of foreign aid in 
developing, less-developed, and underdeveloped nations, as well as in Latin America and the 
Caribbean. However, little scholarly research was found on assessing the effectiveness of foreign 
aid by predicting Human Development Index (HDI) values, and even less was found on 
economic studies examining English-speaking Caribbean countries. The purpose of this paper 
will be to analyze the impact of U.S. foreign aid on English-speaking Caribbean countries by 
investigating a sample of the 4 of these nations which receive the most U.S. foreign assistance. 
These countries are: the Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. This research is 




profound as previous literature suggests in the English-speaking Caribbean. Additionally, there 
may be previously unobserved factors influencing HDI that can be uncovered through this 
research that may provide clearer insights into future aid allocation strategies to this region. By 
utilizing the HDI and its components, which encompasses both social and economic metrics, it is 
hoped that the impact of U.S. foreign assistance can be captured more holistically. It is 
instructive to note that despite steadily increasing levels of HDI, seen in Figure 3 below, total aid 
disbursements to each country show significant variations. This observation suggests that there is 
valuable knowledge to be uncovered by investigating this discrepancy, which at first is not 
apparent. 
 
Figure 3: Human Development Index by Country, The Bahamas, Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad 
and Tobago 2001-2016 
 
To assess the relationship being examined in this paper, Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) 




effects. The results of this study indicate that U.S. foreign aid and human development share a 
small, negative, but statistically insignificant relationship. However, when considering the 
impact of foreign aid on the components of HDI, it is insightful that aid has a negative, 
statistically significant impact on the GNI index. Overall, declines in maternal mortality and 
HIV/AIDs rates, increasing tax revenues, and other unobservable variables seem to be the true 
influencers of human development and could be crowding out the impact of foreign aid on the 
islands in the sample. 
Following a literature review, the data and methodology are presented, followed by a 
discussion of the results. The paper ends with a brief conclusion, potential policy 
recommendations, and areas for further research related to this topic. 
 
Literature Review:  
Previous literature on the impacts of U.S. foreign aid on developing, less developed, and 
underdeveloped countries have yielded a wide range of findings. For instance, Ekanayake (2010) 
draws on the research of Papanek (1973) and other scholars2, who conclude in their research that 
foreign aid has a positive impact on growth in less-developed countries. However, researchers 
such as Burnside and Dollar (2000) and Brautigam and Knack (2004) suggest a negative impact, 
and others like Mosley (1980) have found that foreign aid exerts no impact on economic 
growth3. For the purpose of this research, it is crucial to acknowledge the presence of some type 
of impact exerted by foreign aid on the countries being investigated in the sample. 
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However, it is essential to firstly, define foreign aid, and to examine its true purpose 
within the Caribbean region. Brunton (2000) of the Caribbean Development Bank, defines 
foreign aid, commonly known as official development assistance (ODA), as any grant, form of 
debt forgiveness, or concessional loan which is composed of a grant component of at least 25%, 
which comes from the government of a developed country and its multilateral agencies. The 
same source argues that the economic rationale behind foreign aid is to bridge the savings and 
foreign exchange gaps in underdeveloped countries to promote the levels of domestic savings 
and investments necessary to attain sustainable economic growth.   
This research paper however, aims to enhance the perspective of Brunton (2000) by 
exploring the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid not only in achieving economic growth, but also 
in aligning developing economies with the socio-economic framework provided by the United 
Nations’ Millennium Development Goals (MDGs), which deal with humanitarian indicators of 
development, as well as the Trump Administration’s proposed agenda of addressing U.S. 
domestic concerns in the region such as irregular migration and transnational crime. Bermeo and 
Leblang (2015) actually posit that foreign aid is utilized by donor countries in the context of a 
wider immigration strategy to decrease the push factors which spur migration by facilitating 
economic development in developing countries. Furthermore, Kandemir (2012) posits that 
income, education, and health remain the primary causes of migration, which adds relevance to 
my research which will explore whether or not foreign aid is offering any assistance to these 
socio-economic concerns. 
With regards to trends in U.S. foreign aid data, Brunton (2000) states that the rate of 
decline in foreign aid to the Caribbean is the fastest than that of any other region in the world. 




In light of Brunton’s findings, Niyonkuru (2016) purports that foreign aid acts as a form 
of economic exploitation which deteriorates the economies of developing nations and serve only 
as short term interventions which lack any sustainable impact. Niyonkuru argues that the volatile 
and unpredictable nature of aid, exacerbated by corruption and mismanagement inherent in the 
bureaucracy, delays progress on existing projects and initiatives, which hampers the possibility 
of any long-term impact. Additionally, McGillivray et al. (2001) state that while foreign aid can 
increase access to social services and amenities like education and healthcare, it does not 
improve the quality or quantity of these facilities. As a result, poverty is stabilized but not 
alleviated due to the lagging nature of aid. Consequently, according to Lipton, Toye and Cassen 
(1986), foreign aid may be ineffective in reaching needy populations, which underscores 
Niyonkuru’s notion of aid mismanagement.  
Socio-economic and historical intuition supports the investigation of the relationships 
between politics, the economy, and foreign financial assistance. Svensson (2000), and Djankov 
et al. (2008) argue that foreign aid affects the democratic stances of political systems within 
developing countries, and leads to an increase in government expenditure and a reduction in 
investment, which slows economic growth. Furthering the discussion of the political impact of 
foreign aid, Young and Sheehan (2014) conclude that foreign aid hampers economic growth due 
to deteriorations in developing nations’ legal systems and property rights frameworks, as well as 
their international trade freedoms. Notwithstanding, Boone (1994) makes the claim that the 
disconnection between a nation’s policies and aid which it receives mainly serve the donor’s 
interests rather than the needs of the recipient. Slusher and Blackman (2000) delve more deeply 
into the role of the donor in shaping the impact of foreign aid by concluding that donor 




developing countries, and that the lack of donor coordination results in high aid transaction costs 
and a decreasing positive impact.  
Economic theory suggests that the impacts of foreign aid on the economy are primarily 
attributed to fiscal and budgetary changes, which affect investment, taxes, and government 
expenditure. White (1993) supports this economic notion by stating that aid can result in not only 
an increase in taxes, as well as an increase in government expenditure, exceeding the value of the 
aid inflow, but also a decline in national income. Furthermore, McGillivray et al. (2006), 
highlight the ineffectiveness of foreign aid by suggesting that it has decreasing economic returns, 
is subject to external, climactic, and political conditions, and is influenced by institutional 
quality. This finding is supported by Easterly and Pfutze (2008) who argue that among others, 
certain types of aid tend to be insignificant to growth and development, namely tied aid, food 
aid, and technical assistance, the most relevant components to my research being technical 
assistance. 
Conversely, it can also be argued that foreign aid is beneficial to developing countries. 
From an economic standpoint, Tsikata (1999) posits that there is a positive relationship between 
aid and domestic savings and investment given that policy adjustment efforts are sustained, 
which somewhat mirrors the word of Boone (1994). Feyzioglu, Swaroop, and Zhu (1998) have 
also found similar positive relationships between aid and public investment in their study which 
utilized a sample of 14 developing countries over a 20 year period.  
In a similar vein, Morrissey (2001) indicates that foreign aid can result in economic 
growth not only through increases in investment, but also through: increasing physical and 
human capital, amplifying the country’s capacity to import technology and capital goods, and 




encouraging “endogenous technical change.” This finding is underscored by a study completed 
by Karras (2006) on a sample of 71 aid-receiving developing economies which concluded that 
foreign aid has a positive, permanent, and statistically significant impact on economic growth, 
and that on average, a per capita increase in aid by $20 is associated with a permanent 0.16% 
increase in that country’s real GDP growth rate, not accounting for the effects of country-specific 
policies. 
Bauer (1981) supports Morrissey and Karras by arguing that foreign financial assistance 
fosters economic development, reduces poverty, and facilitates income redistribution. He 
enhances these findings by stating that financial aid assists in fixing past economic mistakes, as 
well as acts as a population control measure among others. Similarly, White (1993), in contrast 
to his prior notions, posits that foreign financial aid translates into higher incomes, and as a 
result, higher levels of domestic savings, and that the crowding out of private investment by aid 
can actually reduce taxes. In summary, White finds that the impact of aid on economic variables 
depends heavily upon each country’s relationship between aid inflows and private investment. 
Gomanee et al. (2005) reinforce White’s conclusions in their empirical study which suggests that 
aid has a positive impact on developing economies through increases in investment. 
Furthermore, Farah et al. (2018) find that increases in foreign aid encourage foreign direct 
investment (FDI), which is likely to create jobs and lead to a decline in unemployment. 
Regarding the social aspect of this relationship, Burnside and Dollar (1998) have found 
that economic growth is followed by improvements, though not as profound as those in growth, 
in social indicators like poverty rates, measured by infant mortality, within the framework of a 
“good policy environment.” This is an essential finding to my research as several social 




will be considered. Testing these factors will be of immense importance when considering the 
work of Veilette, Ribando, and Sullivan (2006), who report that Trinidad and Tobago and 
Barbados have some of the highest HIV infection rates in the Caribbean, with rates of 3.2% for 
the former and over 1% for the latter, which is high considering the vulnerability of small island 
developing states to contagious diseases. 
To summarize, evidence on foreign financial assistance concludes that aid has socio-
economic impacts on developing countries. Economic findings suggest that foreign aid can result 
in changes in investment, taxes, government expenditure, income, and unemployment. 
Furthermore, research indicates that the effects of foreign aid can be observed through social 
institutions such as the legal, education, healthcare, and political systems among others. 
Therefore, my research follows the premise that there are both positive and negative effects of 
U.S. foreign financial aid on socio-economic development in developing countries and seeks to 
disprove the notion that aid and development are uncorrelated. 
 
Data and Methodology:  
Basic summary statistics, namely, means, medians, maximums, minimums, standard 
deviations, labels, and descriptions of the data can be found in Table 1. It is particularly 
important to note that while the sample consists of countries which have relatively close per 
capita Gross Domestic Products (GDPs) as seen in Appendix 1, Figure 1, there are pronounced 
disparities across several of the variables used in the study4, which may provide useful insights in 
the discussion of the results. In order to capture fluctuations in HDI values across different 
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islands over time, a panel dataset was utilized. The sample included the 4 English-speaking 
Caribbean countries which receive the highest annual amounts of U.S. aid namely the Bahamas, 
Barbados, Jamaica, and Trinidad and Tobago. These 4 developing nations share similar socio-
economic conditions, as well as social, financial, and political ties. Thus, the choice to limit the 
data to these 4 islands allows for more accurate generalizations not only regarding English-
speaking Caribbean nations but also small, developing nations. Moreover, the choice to employ 
HDI as the key variable of interest was based on its ability to encapsulate human development in 
both social and economic spheres. Separating the HDI into its primary components also allowed 
for further analyses of the impact of foreign assistance on health, education, and income 
respectively. 
The HDI score aims to cover 3 broad dimensions, namely a long and healthy life, 
knowledge, and a decent standard of living. These dimensions are captured utilizing 4 key 
metrics: life expectancy at birth, the mean and expected years of schooling, and the Gross 
National Income (GNI) per capita (PPP $). These indicators are then quantified in 3 indices: the 
life expectancy, education, and GNI indices, which form the HDI index5. GDP per capita was not 
included as an independent variable as theoretically, GDP should be equal to GNI for any given 
year under the economic assumption that all goods produced within a country will be consumed. 
The decision to use HDI as the dependent variable resulted in all independent variables being 
modeled using a 1 year lag6, which was selected among 1-4 year lags by the significance of each 
model. This strategy seemed necessary as HDI may not be an effective predictor of short-term 
growth because the literacy and mortality components of HDI are not as quickly impacted by 
                                                 
5 HDI calculations can be found in Appendix 1. 
6
 Davies (n.d.) in his paper investigating HDI and the Optimal Size of Government models his variables using a 1 




socio-economic changes as is the economic component. However, the surprising significance of 
the 1 year lag over the 2, 3, and 4 year lags respectively could be attributed to limitations in the 
calculation of the HDI. Moreover, the HDI index and its components were normalized by 
multiplying its values by 100 for ease of interpretation. 
To analyze the holistic impact of U.S. foreign aid on HDI and its composite indices, 
controls were utilized for both economic and social variables. The control datasets were all 
obtained from World Bank Open Data. The key variable in this study was constructed by 
calculating the amount of per capita total aid disbursed per year to each island in constant 2016 
U.S. dollars. This dataset was collected from the USAID International Aid Transparency 
Initiative (IATI). This allowed the models to assume consistency in the distribution of foreign 
aid across each population. It was expected that increases in per capita U.S. aid disbursements 
would spur overall socio-economic growth, and lead to improvements in standards of living, 
which would be reflected in a higher HDI score. Moreover, an interaction term was constructed 
that could assess the effectiveness of U.S. financial assistance for years in which an increase in 
aid was recorded. While the same impact of total aid per capita was anticipated, this interaction 
term was intended to investigate the current Administration’s hypothesis that economic growth 
provided a suitable basis for decreasing aid disbursements to the region.  
To control for the impacts of economic growth factors on human development, 
unemployment rates, tax revenues as percentages of GDP, net Foreign Direct Investment (FDI) 
inflows, and international tourism receipts were included. It was expected that a control for 
unemployment would show an inverse relationship between job creation rates and HDI, as more 
jobs would result in higher levels of consumption, leading to economic growth, and render the 




education. The latter 3 economic variables were expected to have a positive relationship with 
predicted HDI scores. Increasing amounts of foreign capital injections, as well as tourist dollars 
coming into each island, was thought to promote higher levels of productivity, technology, 
training, environmental sustainability, and employment in relevant sectors. Furthermore, it was 
thought that increases in tax revenues to local governments would signal an increase in 
nationwide employment rates as it indicates that fewer people are receiving assistance through 
social security safety nets and that more people are earning taxable incomes and are therefore 
able to pay taxes. 
Additionally, controls for social indicators of development proved useful in examining 
the direct relationship between U.S. foreign aid and HDI. The intentional homicide and maternal 
mortality rates per 100,000 people, the rate of HIV prevalence, as well as the annual net 
migrations were employed in the models. It was predicted that intentional homicide, maternal 
mortality, and HIV prevalence figures would show inverse relationships with HDI scores by 
indicating poor levels of national security and healthcare. However, it was expected that an 
increase in net migrations would indicate that push factors spurring migration are declining, and 
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Table 1: Sample Summary Statistics  
Variable   Units   Mean   St.Dev   Min   Max 
 HDI Units 75.995 3.716 67.3 80.7 
 Life expectancy Index Units 81.927 3.599 74.7 86.1 
 Educational Index Units 69.653 4.729 56.9 77.7 
 GNI Index Units 77.281 7.508 65.3 86.4 
 Aid per capita 2016 USD 9.271 10.211 0.158 54.055 
 Homicides Per 100K people  27.039 15.227 6.823 60.991 
 Maternal Mortality Per 100K people 66.927 21.299 27 93 
 Net Migration People -21500 39866.21 -93096 15483 
 HIV % of population   1.684 0.633 0.5 2.8 
 Tourism Current USD 43.299 23.685 2.848 77.856 
 Unemployment % of labor force 10.057 3.23 3.31 16.18 
 Tax revenues % of GDP 21.516 6.276 8.999 30.258 
 FDI Current USD 4.66e+08 5.63e+08 -1.90e+09 2.80e+09 
 N  64 64 64 64 
 
In order to capture the effect that U.S. foreign aid may have on human development 
within specific islands, a Fixed-Effects (FE) panel estimation is employed.8 Utilizing this 
strategy, some potentially unobservable differences specifically demographic and socio-
economic differences, which are country-specific, can be statistically addressed. Furthermore, 
time fixed-effects are employed to expose time trends excluded by the chosen variables as well 
as those caused by statistically obscure phenomena such as cultural and ideological shifts. For 
instance, HDI scores rise over time for each island as illustrated in Figure 3, while the prevalence 
of HIV inherently falls, which makes sense in the context of heightened sexual awareness, and 
increased sex education and access to preventative methods. 
To ensure that an FE estimator is in fact more suitable than is a Random-Effects (RE) 
estimator for dealing with cross-sectional endogeneity in this study, a Hausman test is run. This 
test confirmed that the independent effects are correlated with the independent variables, which 
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is intuitive given the interrelatedness of social wellbeing and economic growth. This is evident 
through the observation of a significant p-value (chi2(3) = 23.64 and prob > chi2 = 0.000), and 
was expected due to the nature of panel data. Additionally, shocks in one island in the sample are 
likely to be experienced to some degree by the others due to geographic proximity and close 
economic ties, which foreshadowed the need for FE estimators. Thus, FE estimators were chosen 
over RE estimators for this research.  
Moreover, to confirm that time fixed-effects are necessary to address inherent time trends 
across countries, a Wald test is run. The statistically significant p-value (F(14, 32) = 24.72 and 
prob > F = 0.000) indicated that this was the case. This result was unsurprising as it is expected 
that the variables included in this paper are all subject to extraneous factors produced over time. 
By running the models used in the FE regression analysis with time fixed-effects, it is hoped that 
some of these unobservable trends can be uncovered. 
The initial regression analysis will focus on utilizing FE and time FE estimators to 
investigate the effect of U.S. foreign aid on HDI. These variables include: total aid per capita, 
maternal mortality, net migration, international tourism receipts, unemployment, tax revenues, 
and FDI. Furthermore, as a response to the UN MDG pertaining to halting the spread of 
HIV/AIDs, as well as the Trump Administration’s proposition to focus on addressing pressing 
issues like the prevalence of HIV/AIDs in Latin America and the Caribbean, the HIV prevalence 
variable was added into the model.9 Additionally, an interaction term was added by multiplying 
the dollar increase in aid by 1 if aid increased in that year and 0 if it did not. This strategy was 
aimed at capturing the effects of years which saw increases in U.S. foreign aid compared to years 
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during which aid disbursements declined or remained constant. Furthermore, intentional 
homicide rates per 100,000 people were included as proxies used to measure each island’s level 
of national security over time. The model is represented by the following equation: 
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐻𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽9(𝐴𝑖𝑑 х 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽10𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡              (1) 
Where HDI refers to the normalized HDI score on a scale of 0 to 100 (100 indicating a utopian 
human development scenario) in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, while  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 represents the OLS-assumed error 
term. 
As discussed previously, the conclusion of the Wald test necessitated the implementation 
of year fixed-effects. As a result, the model constructed in Equation 1 was run with the additions 
of year dummy variables aimed at uncovering any unobserved time trends in the data. The time 
fixed-effects OLS panel models are illustrated below: 
𝐻𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡   +
 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐻𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽9(𝐴𝑖𝑑 х 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽10𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝑦𝑒𝑎𝑟 + 𝜀𝑖,𝑡           (2) 
                                    
Where year refers to the coefficients of each year dummy for each of the 4 countries, which 
allow for interpretations of the signs and magnitudes of the suspected time trends for each year.   
 Furthermore, following the previously illustrated models, country clustered robust 




coefficients as the results obtained through panel data regression analyses can sometimes be 
skewed by similarities across clusters, or countries in this case. This check is essential as the 
clustered nature of panel data makes the sample standard errors more likely to be correlated 
across clusters which may overstate the precision of the OLS estimators. 
 Following the regression analyses employing HDI as the dependent variable, the model 
was run utilizing each of the 3 components of HDI as new dependent variables. This strategy 
aimed to uncover any influence that foreign aid may be exerting on the dimensions of human 
development, namely life expectancy, education, and income that may be significant, but not 
robust enough as to shift the overall index value. These models were run as OLS panel 
regressions using FE estimators but did not require independent variable lags as each index is 
calculated using data from only the previous year. The models for each composite index are 
illustrated below: 
𝐿𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐻𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽9(𝐴𝑖𝑑 х 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽10𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (3) 
𝐸𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐻𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽9(𝐴𝑖𝑑 х 𝑇𝑜𝑡𝑎𝑙 𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑖𝑛𝑐𝑟𝑒𝑎𝑠𝑒)𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽10𝐻𝑜𝑚𝑖𝑐𝑖𝑑𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡  +  𝜀𝑖,𝑡             (4) 
𝐼𝐼𝑖,𝑡  =  𝛽0  + 𝛽1𝐴𝑖𝑑 𝑝𝑒𝑟 𝑐𝑎𝑝𝑖𝑡𝑎𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽2𝑀𝑎𝑡𝑒𝑟𝑛𝑎𝑙 𝑀𝑜𝑟𝑡𝑎𝑙𝑖𝑡𝑦𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽3𝑀𝑖𝑔𝑟𝑎𝑡𝑖𝑜𝑛𝑖,𝑡  +
 𝛽4𝑇𝑜𝑢𝑟𝑖𝑠𝑚𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽5𝑈𝑛𝑒𝑚𝑝𝑙𝑜𝑦𝑚𝑒𝑛𝑡𝑖,𝑡  +  𝛽6𝑇𝑎𝑥 𝑅𝑒𝑣𝑒𝑛𝑢𝑒𝑠𝑖,𝑡 +  𝛽7𝐹𝐷𝐼𝑖,𝑡  + 𝛽8𝐻𝐼𝑉𝑖,𝑡  +





Where LEI, EI, and II refer to the normalized Life Expectancy, Educational, and Income Index 
scores on a scale of 0 to 100 (100 indicating a utopian scenario) in country 𝑖 at time 𝑡, while  𝜀𝑖,𝑡 




Table 2: Fixed Effects, Time Fixed Effects, and Time Fixed Effects using Robust Standard 
Errors OLS Panel Regression Results10 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 hdi100 hdi100 hdi100 
lagaid_pc1 -0.000791 -0.000132 -0.000132 
 (0.0245) (0.00968) (0.00795) 
    
laghomicides1 0.0235 0.00633 0.00633 
 (0.0285) (0.0117) (0.00792) 
    
lagmaternalmo
rtality1 
-0.261*** -0.107*** -0.107** 
 (0.0614) (0.0285) (0.0273) 
    
lagnetmigratio
n1 
0.0000801* 0.0000158 0.0000158 
 (0.0000440) (0.0000209) (0.0000230) 
    
laghiv1 -4.028*** -1.388** -1.388 
 (1.425) (0.669) (0.908) 
    
lagintltourism
1 
-0.104** 0.00969 0.00969 
 (0.0490) (0.0253) (0.0277) 
    
lagunemploym
ent1 
0.149* -0.0818* -0.0818* 
 (0.0849) (0.0410) (0.0275) 
    
lagtaxrevpercg
dp1 
0.590*** 0.144** 0.144** 
 (0.124) (0.0533) (0.0253) 
    
                                                 




lagfdi1 -5.04e-10* 2.44e-10 2.44e-10 
 (2.76e-10) (1.46e-10) (1.46e-10) 
    
lagaidinc1 -9.94e-09 -4.34e-09 -4.34e-09 
 (1.70e-08) (7.05e-09) (8.70e-09) 













 (8.459) (3.969) (4.491) 
N              60              60              60 
R2 0.590 0.965 0.965 
adj. R2 0.474 0.936 0.942 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
  
The initial model, which utilizes FE estimators as predictors of HDI shows that U.S. 
foreign aid disbursements per capita have a small, negative, but statistically insignificant impact 
on predicted HDI scores. It can be noted that a $1000 increase in aid per capita is associated with 
a 0.791 unit decrease in HDI score when controlling for the other social and economic variables 
included in the model. Additionally, model 1 illustrates that the impact of foreign aid seems to be 
crowded out by variations in maternal mortality, net migration, and unemployment rates, tax 
revenues, international tourism receipts, HIV prevalence, and net FDI inflows. This inference 
could explain the negative coefficient on the aid per capita variable despite rising levels of 
socioeconomic progress and as a result, HDI scores over time. Furthermore, the negative 
coefficient on the interaction variable for aid increases, while insignificant, was instructive as it 
suggested that for years where an increase in total aid disbursed was recorded, HDI scores on 
average fell by approximately 0.00001 units for every $1000 in aid. This is in itself, a relevant 
finding which allowed for a comparison between the long and short-run impacts of U.S. foreign 




The healthcare indicators, maternal mortality and HIV rates seemed to be inversely 
related to HDI, whereas the signs on the tax revenues and net migration variables suggest 
positive relationships, which were unsurprising findings. However, it was peculiar that the signs 
on the unemployment variable was positive, and that those on the international tourism receipts, 
FDI, and aid increase variables were negative, which gave another indication that time fixed 
effects were necessary.  
In order to test for the incidence of an observable time trend in the models, the panel 
regression shown in model 1 was run using time FE estimators in the forms of year dummy 
variables as seen in model 2 as well as in Appendix 1, Table 1. 
These results were instructive as they suggested that the negative, but still statistically 
insignificant impact of U.S. foreign aid on HDI was even weaker than was previously deduced. It 
was observed that a $1000 increase in aid per capita is associated with a 0.1 unit decrease in 
normalized HDI score when controlling for the other social and economic variables included in 
the model. Furthermore, maternal mortality, HIV prevalence, and unemployment rates, tax 
revenues, and international tourism receipts remained statistically significant, and changes in the 
signs of the coefficients on the international tourism, unemployment, and FDI reflected more 
economically intuitive interpretations. It was also noteworthy that the interaction term measuring 
the impacts of total aid during years which experienced increased funding, while being 
statistically insignificant, suggested a weak, negative relationship with HDI. Evidently, a $1000 
increase in aid for a particular year resulted in a 0.000004 unit decline in HDI scores, which was 
a notable finding as it exposed the negative short-run impact of U.S. foreign aid on human 




detrimental to Caribbean islands despite its harmful impacts being too small to shift the overall 
HDI value.  
Evidently, time trends were apparent in each model indicated by relatively strong positive 
coefficients as well as statistical significance at the 1% level for the coefficients on each year 
dummy for 2004 to 2016 as illustrated in Appendix 1, Table 1. It is unsurprising that the 
coefficients on each year dummy seems to grow over time. This growth suggests that underlying 
factors might be causing HDI scores to increase each year. This is essential in examining the 
relationship between foreign aid and human development as it introduces the notion that perhaps 
there are less apparent factors at play that are absorbing the statistical impact of U.S. aid on HDI 
than those represented in the models.  
As a robustness check of the models, country clustered robust standard errors were 
employed in order to validate the time FE estimators yielded by the regression as seen in Table 2. 
By utilizing this strategy, unbiased robust standard errors were obtained. These results were 
informative as they suggest that the estimators seen in Table 2 are relatively sound predictors of 
human development. Maternal mortality and unemployment rates, and tax revenues remained 
significant drivers of HDI while the HIV/AIDs variable lost statistical significance. The aid per 
capita and total aid increase variables remained statistically insignificant, and retained their 
relatively small coefficients and negative signs. Thus, the initial claims regarding their positive 
impacts on HDI seem invalid and it seems possible that foreign aid could be detrimental to 
overall human development. The credibility of the estimators produced by the models was 
reinforced by the consistency in the signs and magnitudes of each coefficient utilized in the 
regression. Despite marginally inflated standard errors in some cases, which are characteristic of 




In addition to the regression models, the Pesaran’s test of cross-sectional independence, 
the Modified Wald test for group wise heteroskedasticity, and the Wooldridge test for 
autocorrelation in panel data were run, all yielding statistically significant p-values of 0.0005, 
0.0017, and 0.0010 respectively. However, given the nature of panel data, these results were 
likely occurrences as the models were expected to show errors due to both cross-sectional and 
time-series related phenomena.   
Table 3: Fixed Effects Component-wise OLS Panel Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 lifeexpectancy100 education100 income100 
aid_pc 0.0276 0.0715 -0.0808*** 
 (0.0228) (0.0473) (0.0179) 
    
homicides 0.0163 0.0609 0.0450** 
 (0.0273) (0.0565) (0.0214) 
    
maternalmorta
lity 
-0.229*** -0.593*** -0.0628 
 (0.0581) (0.121) (0.0456) 
    
netmigration 0.0000722* 0.000123 0.0000533 
 (0.0000417) (0.0000865) (0.0000327) 
    
hiv -4.491*** -8.537*** 0.0522 
 (1.366) (2.832) (1.072) 
    
intltourism -0.0940** -0.183* -0.0442 
 (0.0441) (0.0915) (0.0347) 
    
unemployment 0.245*** 0.240 -0.123* 
 (0.0790) (0.164) (0.0620) 
    
taxrevpercgdp 0.482*** 0.848*** 0.402*** 
 (0.112) (0.231) (0.0876) 
    
fdi -5.53e-10** -9.41e-10* -1.79e-10 
 (2.63e-10) (5.45e-10) (2.06e-10) 
    
aidinc -1.69e-08 -4.25e-08 1.23e-08 




    
_cons 97.28*** 112.0*** 76.59*** 
 (8.028) (16.65) (6.304) 
N 64 64 64 
R2 0.532 0.511 0.731 
adj. R2 0.410 0.384 0.662 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
 
 Following the regression analysis employing the HDI index as the dependent variable, it 
was informative to observe the results of the component-wise panel regressions, which measured 
the impacts of foreign aid on the life expectancy, educational, and GNI indices respectively. It is 
extremely telling that foreign aid seems to exert a statistically significant negative influence on 
the GNI index, which validates the claim that foreign aid is potentially harming Caribbean 
economies despite the statistical insignificance observed in Table 2. On average, it seems that a 
$1 increase in aid per capita is associated with a 0.08 unit decrease in normalized GNI index 
score, which suggests that foreign aid disbursements are primarily harming these countries 
through depleting employment opportunities and wages, and diminishing earning potentials. It 
was also instructive that while statistically insignificant, total aid per capita had weak positive 
relationships with the life expectancy and educational indices respectively, which while 
somewhat promising, suggests that overall, aid is not having a profound impact on the healthcare 
or educational systems in these countries, and is instead being either misallocated or simply 
wasted.  
 Furthermore, given the statistical significance observed in the maternal mortality, HIV 
prevalence, international tourism, unemployment, tax revenues, and FDI variables for at least 2 
of the component models, it can be inferred that these variables prove more suitable predictors of 




claim that foreign aid, while having a statistically significant negative relationship with the GNI 
index, does not exert a strong enough influence on any of the 3 indices to have a profound 
impact on HDI. Thus, foreign aid did not seem effective in improving human development in the 
region over the sample time period. 
 
Discussion of Results:  
In order to assess the effectiveness of U.S. foreign aid in the English-speaking Caribbean, 
the paper relies on FE and time FE OLS panel regression models. Both the initial FE model as 
well as the time FE models with and without robust standard errors suggest that U.S. financial 
aid exerts a weak, negative, statistically insignificant impact on predicted HDI scores. However, 
the component-wise OLS panel regressions using only FE estimators find that foreign aid has a 
negative, statistically significant impact on the GNI or income component of HDI, though not 
one strong enough to shift the overall HDI value. 
It seems that the apparent negative impact of per capita variations in aid is being 
considerably crowded out by several socio-economic variables, namely maternal mortality, net 
migration, and unemployment rates, tax revenues, international tourism receipts, HIV 
prevalence, and net FDI inflows. These claims seem valid when the signs and magnitudes of 
each coefficient are interpreted. It is also evident by analyzing the FE model that increasing aid 
per capita disbursements remain statistically insignificant, which poses the question of whether 
potentially positive impacts of U.S. aid over time are being negated by subsequent, perhaps futile 
increases in aid or misallocated aid disbursements. It seems that the current Administration’s 




and more effective social policies may be a viable strategy considering the regression results. 
Perhaps strong socioeconomic development assisted by unobserved factors such as technological 
advances and increasing levels of educational attainment have allowed the Caribbean region to 
combat the negative implications of foreign aid. However, it could also be the case that the net 
effect of foreign aid on human development is being masked by these aid cuts, meaning that 
consistent increases in disbursements to the Caribbean in different sectors are needed in order to 
produce a more profound, visible, and potentially positive impact. 
The results suggest that declining maternal mortality and HIV/AIDs rates are indicative 
of improving healthcare conditions as well as an increasing focus on pre and post-natal care. 
Perhaps it is also the case that healthcare facilities have been improving across the English-
speaking Caribbean and that medical personnel might be paying closer attention to improving 
women’s pregnancy experiences and outcomes. Additionally, it seems that Caribbean countries 
have been taking steps to ensure sterile hospital environments and to regularize HIV testing and 
sexual education initiatives, which are in line with the UN MDGs and the current 
Administration’s plans to focus efforts on HIV/AIDs prevention. These variables, particularly 
maternal mortality, speak directly to the life expectancy component of HDI, which is evident 
when considering its robust statistical significance observed in model 1 of Table 3. These 
coefficients seem to exert some of the largest predictive capabilities on HDI scores, and it is easy 
to believe that they play significant roles in crowding out the true impact that aid may be having 
on human development, although this seems to be a negative one. 
It is telling that these variables remained statistically significant when time fixed-effects 
were added to the models. These results suggest that perhaps ideological shifts are occurring in 




stigmatization of contraceptive methods, and an overall increase in female empowerment and 
autonomy. This potential conclusion was captured by the significant positive coefficients on the 
year dummy variables as numerical variables often lack the power to accurately encompass 
gradual ideological and cultural shifts. These findings would validate the claim that perhaps 
foreign aid is not a contributing factor towards improvements in the variables that seem to be 
spurring improving human development levels. 
Furthermore, net migration figures showed a positive, statistically significant relationship 
with HDI under the FE regression model. The positive sign on this coefficient was expected. It 
was inferred that perhaps if more people are flowing into a particular island than are migrating 
out, a “brain gain” could be evident whereby skilled labor is entering the Caribbean to pursue 
increased educational and job opportunities causing HDI to increase.  
This phenomenon would indicate that the push factors spurring migration are decreasing 
and that socio-economic conditions in the Caribbean are proving suitable facilitators for upward 
social mobility. Increases in HDI under this scenario would most likely be products of a larger 
value of remittances in foreign denominated dollars and increases in adult literacy. In this case, 
time FE estimators provide a consistent conclusions. These time adjusted coefficients are also 
consistent with initial expectations that pull factors encouraging migration into the Caribbean 
may instead be increasing due to factors that are not controlled for in the models.  
By attracting foreign labor, the region would benefit from higher levels of consumption, 
as well as more diverse skill sets and training opportunities, which would spur economic growth 
and lead to higher HDI scores. It is simple to see how migratory changes could be exerting a 
stronger influence on human development than is foreign aid as it is expected to more quickly 




A similar conclusion can be drawn in the case of the unemployment variable, which 
experienced a change in signs but maintained statistical significance. Under the FE model, it 
would seem that perhaps a more competitive job market could be producing rapidly increasing 
instances of structural unemployment, which would explain higher HDI scores despite increasing 
unemployment. However, under time fixed-effects, the negative sign observed for 
unemployment rates seems more intuitive as lower unemployment rates are known to lead to 
increasing levels of consumption and innovation, and as a result, economic growth.  
Next, it was interesting to explore the impact of increasing tax revenues as a percentage 
of GDP on HDI. This variable remained robust under time fixed-effects and it is simple to see 
how any potential economic harm caused by foreign aid could be overshadowed by its impact. 
Increasing tax revenues according to economic reasoning indicates that unemployment is falling, 
leading to a decline in the proportion of the population needing to rely on social security benefits 
as more people are earning taxable incomes. Thus, it would be expected that increasing tax 
revenues would be significant contributors towards economic growth, evidently more so than 
foreign aid disbursements. This is indicated by the relatively high coefficient on net migration 
compared to that on aid per capita. It was therefore posited that variations in tax revenues could 
be soaking up some of the visible effects of U.S. foreign aid on human development. 
Furthermore, the international tourism receipts variable experienced both a sign change 
and a decline in statistical significance under time fixed-effects. Under the second and third 
models shown in Table 2, it is seen that there is a positive relationship between tourism revenues 
and HDI, which makes economic sense. Tourists consume local goods and contribute to 
economic growth, as well as pump foreign denominated dollars into Caribbean economies. 




economic growth, and countries must maintain acceptable environmental conditions, levels of 
infrastructural development and institutional standards in areas such as healthcare, business 
development, and national security in order to attract tourism. The time trend may also be 
absorbing some of the impacts of tourism revenues on human development because it may be 
capturing the increasing tendencies of foreigners to vacation in places with tropical climates 
during the fall and winter seasons. It can also be the case that U.S. aid is having a positive impact 
on the factors which attract tourism in the Caribbean, which would underscore the notion that 
variations in tourism revenues seem to be contributing to the crowding out of the less-impactful 
aid per capita variable. 
Moreover, analyzing the impact of FDI on HDI scores, a similar case emerges where both 
a change in the signs as well as in the statistical significance is evident. It seems that the 
effectiveness of FDI in the Caribbean may be better captured when exploring long-run impacts. 
The small but positive coefficient of FDI on HDI scores when including year dummies indicates 
that when controlling for unobserved effects over time which either facilitate the effectiveness of 
FDI or expose it, the injection of foreign capital into Caribbean economies improves human 
development. This makes sense in the context of modernization, technological change, increased 
job training, and shifts in consumption habits over time which result in economic growth. 
Increases in foreign aid can without a doubt be affecting FDI inflows but this would depend on 
the reason for the increase or decrease in aid to that country. For instance, an island receiving a 
high quantity of U.S. aid in response to a national security crisis might not experience high levels 
of FDI as large multinationals might perceive that country as a dangerous business environment. 




across the models. Thus, it is possible that the impact of foreign aid is also being absorbed by the 
inclusion of FDI inflows.  
Moreover, analyzing the models presented in Table 3, it is evident that foreign aid is 
proving particularly harmful to production and earning capabilities in the region, suggested by 
the negative sign on the aid variable as well as its statistical significance at the 1% level. It is 
therefore possible that foreign aid is in fact subjected to decreasing economic returns and is 
hampering potential economic growth. This makes sense considering previous literary findings 
which suggest that in the context of corruption, limited institutional capacities, the lack of donor 
coordination, and aid mismanagement, the unpredictability of aid disbursements delays progress 
on projects and growth initiatives, fails to reach economically downtrodden populations, and is 
ultimately unsuccessful in alleviating poverty. It could also be the case that foreign aid could in 
fact be serving the needs of donor organizations without benefitting the recipient countries in the 
same manner. It is unsurprising that these factors could contribute to an overall long-run decline 
in economic wellbeing. However, given the method of HDI calculation, this negative impact 
does not currently seem to be profound enough to shift the overall index value. 
Additionally, the positive although statistically insignificant impact of the aid variable on 
the life expectancy and educational indices suggest that while perhaps there is the potential for 
improvement, foreign aid may not currently be exerting a profound impact on social 
development in the region. It may be plausible that foreign aid has been unable to increase the 
quality of social services and institutions such as schools and hospitals despite various initiatives 
which may increase access to them. Given the natures of healthcare and education, sustainability 
and longevity ought to be emphasized not only in effectively disbursing aid but also in designing 




considering the cases of corruption and aid mismanagement that may be severely hindering 
progress on initiatives aimed at facilitating progress in the social sphere. 
Overall, it does not seem that foreign aid is responsible for the inherent improvements in 
the true drivers of HDI in the English-speaking Caribbean. As a result, it may be possible that the 
socio-economic variables discussed above in addition to time trends within the data could be 
crowding out the true impact of U.S. foreign assistance on human development. However, it 
might be safe to say that the true coefficient on total aid per capita is, in fact, negative, and it 
might be the case that during years when the value of aid disbursements increased, the harmful 
impact of HDI could not be properly observed in the short run, reflected by the negative 
coefficients and statistical insignificance. Additionally, it may also be the case that the slight, 
small-scale increases in HDI scores over time do not provide enough variation to capture the true 
impact of U.S. foreign aid. 
 
Conclusion: 
 While research has been conducted on the impacts of foreign assistance on Latin America 
and the Caribbean, there is little research conducted which focuses on the effectiveness of U.S. 
foreign aid in the English-speaking Caribbean. This paper undertakes that challenge and finds 
some intriguing results. First, it appears that U.S. foreign aid while not statistically impactful is 
negatively correlated with HDI scores. Additionally, it is evident that several primary drivers of 
human development including maternal mortality rates, the prevalence of HIV/AIDs, and tax 
revenue percentages seem to offset any impact that foreign assistance may be having on HDI. 




that while aid may be increasing the ease of access to social amenities, it might not be effective 
in guaranteeing sufficient quantities or qualities of these services. McGillivray’s (2006) claim 
that foreign aid is subject to decreasing economic returns and to extraneous socio-economic, 
political, and environmental factors may also hold water in this research given its significant 
negative impact on the GNI component of the HDI. Thus, previous literature supports both the 
conclusions that foreign aid may be having a negative or not be having as profound of a direct 
impact as intended, and that time trends play significant roles in explaining macroeconomic 
phenomenon. It is important to note that while the results suggests the ineffectiveness of U.S. 
foreign aid, the paper does not deny that perhaps its true potential is not being realized especially 
in the context of decreasing aid inflows to the region as well as other factors such as corruption 
and aid mismanagement.  
 The paper also questions whether U.S. foreign aid is being allocated towards the sectors 
which would be most responsive to budgetary increases, or which have long-standing histories of 
being underfunded such as in the cases of healthcare and education spending. By investigating 
variations in HDI and its components, it can be proposed that the primary components of aid, 
specifically literacy and life expectancy are not being addressed efficiently by U.S. foreign aid 
initiatives. Furthermore, the income component of HDI actually seems to be the one that is most 
severely impacted by foreign aid despite per capita GDPs in the Caribbean experiencing upward 
trajectories, which seem to be facilitated through unobserved shifts and shocks inherent in the 
passage of time. Thus, it is possible that when considering economic wellbeing, foreign aid cuts 
or allocations away from economic spheres may be plausible recommendations. Therefore, an 
appropriate path for the future of U.S. foreign aid administrators might be to structure financial 




across all levels of education. This is not to say that economic growth ought to be neglected, 
especially in light of the Caribbean’s history of political corruption, lagging technological 
development, proportionately low female empowerment, and low exchange rates relative to the 
U.S. dollar. However, it may be the case that the cumulative impact of foreign aid might be more 
profound if it more directly addressed long run solutions to achieving economic growth, as well 
as more humanitarian spheres of development given that the life expectancy and education 
components seemed to have positive relationships with foreign aid though statistically 
insignificant.  
 Future research should aim to uncover unobserved variation captured by drivers of 
human development that were not included in this paper. Furthermore, it can be the case that the 
true impact of U.S. foreign aid might be better observed using a longer lag time, as it is definitely 
possible that the probable benefits of foreign aid are not experienced in the Caribbean until 
several years have passed. Moreover, it is evident that the Caribbean is a niche region with very 
specific socio-economic conditions. Therefore, it might prove a fruitful effort for future 
researchers of the topic to include controls for characteristically Caribbean phenomena such as 
high levels of corruption, high income and wealth inequalities, and the relationships between 
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Appendix 1, Figure 1: Gross Domestic Product (GDP) per capita by Country, The Bahamas, 
Barbados, Jamaica, Trinidad and Tobago 2001-2016 
 
Calculating the HDI: 


























Appendix 1, Table 1: Fixed Effects, Time Fixed Effects, and Time Fixed Effects using Robust 
Standard Errors OLS Panel Regression Results 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 hdi100 hdi100 hdi100 
lagaid_pc1 -0.000791 -0.000132 -0.000132 
 (0.0245) (0.00968) (0.00795) 
    
laghomicides1 0.0235 0.00633 0.00633 
 (0.0285) (0.0117) (0.00792) 
    
lagmaternalmo
rtality1 
-0.261*** -0.107*** -0.107** 
 (0.0614) (0.0285) (0.0273) 
    
lagnetmigratio
n1 
0.0000801* 0.0000158 0.0000158 
 (0.0000440) (0.0000209) (0.0000230) 
    
laghiv1 -4.028*** -1.388** -1.388 
 (1.425) (0.669) (0.908) 
    
lagintltourism
1 
-0.104** 0.00969 0.00969 
 (0.0490) (0.0253) (0.0277) 
    
lagunemploym
ent1 
0.149* -0.0818* -0.0818* 
 (0.0849) (0.0410) (0.0275) 
    
lagtaxrevpercg
dp1 
0.590*** 0.144** 0.144** 
 (0.124) (0.0533) (0.0253) 
    
lagfdi1 -5.04e-10* 2.44e-10 2.44e-10 
 (2.76e-10) (1.46e-10) (1.46e-10) 
    
lagaidinc1 -9.94e-09 -4.34e-09 -4.34e-09 
 (1.70e-08) (7.05e-09) (8.70e-09) 







  (.) (.) 
    
2003.year  0.242 0.242 
  (0.354) (0.549) 




2004.year  1.153*** 1.153** 
  (0.332) (0.294) 
    
2005.year  1.460*** 1.460** 
  (0.335) (0.361) 
    
2006.year  1.536*** 1.536*** 
  (0.359) (0.0880) 
    
2007.year  1.789*** 1.789*** 
  (0.358) (0.268) 
    
2008.year  2.255*** 2.255** 
  (0.355) (0.613) 
    
2009.year  2.018*** 2.018*** 
  (0.421) (0.243) 
    
2010.year  2.570*** 2.570** 
  (0.349) (0.456) 
    
2011.year  3.117*** 3.117*** 
  (0.333) (0.213) 
    
2012.year  3.840*** 3.840*** 
  (0.351) (0.266) 
    
2013.year  4.116*** 4.116*** 
  (0.376) (0.209) 
    
2014.year  4.134*** 4.134*** 
  (0.373) (0.123) 
    
2015.year  4.024*** 4.024*** 
  (0.375) (0.134) 
    
2016.year  3.741*** 3.741*** 
  (0.384) (0.378) 









 (8.459) (3.969) (4.491) 
N 60 60 60 
R2 0.590 0.965 0.965 
adj. R2 0.474 0.936 0.942 
Standard errors in parentheses 
* p < 0.10, ** p < 0.05, *** p < 0.01 
